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the private sector is facilitated by six staff 
members of the LWIB, who continually 
call on businesses to inquire about the 
type of skills businesses require. They 
also conduct focus groups and pursue 




The joint study examined cases in 
which LWIBs have worked within 
the flexibility and decentralization of 
the U.S. workforce system to foster 
collaboration among local organizations. 
It observed that there was no one right 
way to form effective partnerships. 
Rather, the flexibility of the workforce 
system allowed LWIBs to bring key 
stakeholders and organizations together 
in ways that worked best for job seekers 
and employers, which can enhance job 
creation. The study also underscored 
the benefit of working closely with 
businesses to understand their needs for 
qualified workers and to design training 
curricula that address those needs. 
Furthermore, WIA’s culture of evidence-
based policy making and performance 
outcome monitoring established by WIA 
workforce programs sets an example for 
other organizations within the local area 
to follow.  
Note
The assistance of Jonathan Barr and 
Francesca Froy of the OECD/LEED and 
Robert Straits of the Upjohn Institute in 
preparing the full U.S. report is greatly 
appreciated.
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How Time and Regulatory Attainment Matter
This article highlights some of the findings in 
the author’s new book, Stages of Occupational 
Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies, 
published by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. See the back cover for 
information on how to order the book. 
   George Shultz, the astute 
academic, businessman, Secretary of 
Labor, and later premier statesman, 
opined that from his long years in 
government service, lags occur with 
general public policy issues, but that 
politicians are impatient (Shultz 1995). 
Occupational licensing generally fits this 
model, since it is an institution whose 
effects are not immediately apparent, but 
rather reveal their efficacy over some 
time. Specifically, occupational licensing 
usually grandfathers in practitioners, 
implements new exams, and develops 
educational and location-specific 
requirements so that implementing 
these policies usually takes many years. 
Consequently, the labor market or 
consumer outcomes are not immediately 
apparent—a longer-run perspective is 
required to fully understand the wage, 
price, quality, and distributional effects. 
An approach that evaluates the various 
stages of occupational regulation can 
help capture and illuminate the role 
that licensing has in labor and service 
markets.
As I point out in an earlier volume, 
unions and licensing membership are 
moving in different directions (Kleiner 
2006; Kleiner and Krueger 2013). 
As shown in Figure 1, occupational 
licensing has continued to grow in the 
United States in contrast to the decline of 
unionization. For example, in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, less than 10 percent of 
the workforce required an occupational 
license to work for pay. However, by 
2008, estimates from the Princeton Data 
Improvement Initiative show that about 
29 percent of the workforce required 
a license from local, state, or federal 
government to work for pay. With the 
decline of union membership and the 
growth of employment in the service 
sector, workers and their agents (unions 
or professional associations) have 
attempted to establish a “web of rules” to 
regularize work and reduce competition 
in the field (Dunlop 1958). 
Occupations are rarely formed as 
licensed ones. Occupations evolve, 
organize, and often select licensing as 
a method to obtain professionalism, 
quality, and status, as well as to limit 
the supply of practitioners. They 
tax their members through dues and 
engage in political activities that lead to 
registration, certification, and eventually 
licensing. The process of regulation 
across political jurisdictions often takes 
years or decades to achieve full licensure. 
Consequently, new occupations are 
often in varying stages of the regulatory 
process as they seek to become regulated 
by units of government. Since regulation 
mainly influences new entrants, it would 
take some time before the full effect 
of licensing would influence either 
the individuals in the occupation (in 
terms of wages and employment) or the 
consumers of their services. It usually 
takes some time for individuals who are 
grandfathered into the occupation, and 
have less measured human capital than 
newly regulated practitioners, to retire 
or leave the job. Occupations at a more 
mature stage of regulation would be more 
likely to have the benefits or advantages 
of the various stages of licensing than 
those that have recently sought or 
obtained regulation at different levels of 
government.
In the book Stages of Occupational 
Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies, I 
examine seven occupations at various 
stages of regulation generally moving 
from low to universal. A goal of the 
book is to examine a broad variety 
of occupations that include blue- and 
white-collar occupations at different 
stages of occupational regulation by 
government. The occupations examined 
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in the book are listed in Figure 2 by the 
number of states that licensed them in 
2007, the starting point of my analysis. 
They go from interior designers, who 
are regulated in only three states and the 
District of Columbia, to dental hygienists 
and dentists, who are licensed in all 
states and are required to have a license 
to do their work. For dentists and dental 
hygienists, a competition develops 
between the occupations over who is 
allowed to supervise and which tasks are 
permitted for each occupational group. 
The level of rigor of the regulations 
for an occupation, and the longer the 
occupation has been licensed, do matter 
in key labor market outcomes such as 
wages and employment. 
The central findings using various 
governmental databases are shown in 
Table 1. As an occupation progresses 
from less to more regulation, the 
influence of licensing becomes larger. 
The major effects of licensing on 
wage determination do not become 
consequential until an occupation is 
universally licensed for a substantial 
period of time, and nearly all in the 
occupation must be licensed. For 
occupations such as interior designers, 
preschool teachers, and even mortgage 
brokers, the influence of occupational 
licensing is minimal or modest. Of 
the occupations examined, the largest 
influence of occupational licensing on 
wage determination is for dentists and 
hygienists—virtually all individuals in 
these occupations must attain licensure. 
For electricians and plumbers, the 
wage effects of regulation are modest 
to moderate, and having state by state 
licensing does not appear to have an 
influence on the work-related health 
and safety of workers as measured by 
occupational deaths or injuries. For 
mortgage brokers, having a bonding 
requirement is modestly associated with 
higher earnings, but it did not appear to 
enhance consumer well-being. Similarly, 
greater regulation of preschool teachers 
did not raise earnings, but it did have 
a small negative influence on access to 
center-based care and had no overall 
effect on student test scores. 
A review of the licensing literature 
found that for many occupations in the 
United States, the length of time that the 
NOTE: Dashed line shows the value of estimates from state-level data of licensing from the Gallup 
and Westat survey results, including licensing by local, state, or federal governments. More than 
800 occupations are licensed on at least one level, according to the Council of State Governments.
SOURCE: Licensing data are estimated from the author’s surveys, Department of Labor estimates, 
a Gallup survey, and a Westat survey; union data are from the Current Population Survey.
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licensing had been in effect mattered and 
was positive; a national study analyzing 
UK data found similar results. Further, 
the key factor in the effects of licensing 
on wage determination was whether 
the individual attained a license rather 
than if the state passed a licensing law 
generally regulating the occupation. Two 
occupations that differ in this respect 
yet illustrate the point are dentists 
and engineers. Occupational licensing 
would be expected to have a larger 
influence on dentists, where almost all 
individuals who identify themselves as 
dentists have a license. Only a licensed 
dentist can perform or supervise most 
dental procedures for pay by state law. 
In contrast, for engineers, who are 
universally covered by licensing laws, 
only a minority of engineers seeks or 
obtains a license from the government 
(Hur, Kleiner, and Wang 2013). Most 
tasks that engineers perform are not ones 
that require a license from government. 
Only a relatively small number of jobs 
that engineers perform are explicitly 
regulated by law. Consequently, the 
impact of licensing on wages and 
employment are much smaller for 
engineers than for dentists.
Occupational licensing influences the 
labor market for licensed and unlicensed 
practitioners. It affects the ability and 
costs for consumers to obtain important 
services. Moreover, it determines the 
distribution of those services among the 
well-off and those in or near poverty. 
It also helps to determine the structure 
of markets where service market 
monopolies are provided by government. 
As the politics of occupational licensing 
ebbs and flows with economic and 
political trends, it is important to 
shine the light on data and analysis to 
determine both the equity and efficiency 
aspects through the various stages of the 
evolution of occupational licensing.
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Occupation
Level of occupational 
regulation Labor market effects Other
Interior designers Low None to modest wage 
and employment 
effects
State efforts to become 
universally licensed
Mortgage brokers Low to moderate Modest wage and 
employment effects
Recent moves to gain 
universal licensing, more 




Moderate Modest to no wage 
effects
Movement to universal 
licensing, little evidence 




High Moderate wage 
effects
Movement to make 
regulations more 
stringent, little evidence 
of any influence on 
worker safety
Dentists and dental 
hygienists
Universal Moderate to high 
wage effects
Relaxed regulations result 
in gains for hygienists at 
the expense of dentists
Table 1  Summary of Key Findings in the Volume
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